Kazcynski's 'power-process' and rational choice theory

In his manifesto, Industrial Society and Its Future, Theodore Kazcinsky describes what he calls the 'power process' as a constituent of human nature. This 'power-process' is meant to describe the natural drives of human nature that have led it to repeated evolutionary success. It is our will to live, in a sense, coupled with an understanding of what vital human labor actually is. Kacynski argued that industrial society had changed the dynamic of the power-process. Whereas in pre-industrial social contexts, the work of procuring one's subsistence had been directly in contact with the nature from which one wrested one's existence, now, physical needs are largely met and the effort spent to procure them is considerably weakened. Instead, 'surrogate activities' tend to predominate our energies. Here, the goals are vague, intangibles with incredible variations. But Kaczinsky's argument is that having real goals concretely stated in the conditions of nature--of procuring one's existence directly from it--so much more greatly fulfills the human desire for autonomy and true happiness, that in industrial society this truth has been sadly forgotten.

Rational choice theory is that science which seeks to identify the most strategic rationality for fulfilling objectives. If I want A I must do B. and so on. The Prisoner's Dilemma is a favorite example. Prisoner A and B are both guilty of a crime. The police separate the two and offer each the same deal: you either confess and, if your brother confesses, you'll both get only 1 year; if you confess and he doesn't you'll walk scott free but he'll get 10 years. Well, what is the right answer given the options? This is the kind of thing that rational choice theory attempts to understand. One of its elements is the theory of action. Another is the theory of value.
Is Kaczinsky's argument 'rational' by any standard? That is, in many ways the wrong question. The right question is whether Kazcynski's power process is a reasonable theory of practical action. Let's consider what he says in sections 33-42.
K argues that there are four elements in the order of practical action
1. goal
2. effort
3. attainment of goal
4. Autonomy

So, an action taken to procure a log of wood for the fire begins with a framing of the goal: the formation of an intention. Next, effort is expended by getting out of the chair and going to the wood bin and getting a few sticks of wood. Attainment of the goal is getting in the wood, perhaps getting the fire going, and so on. Lastly, autonomy is that sense that is born out of the ability to have formed an intention, carried through an action, and achieved the goal.

That strikes me as very reasonable. It is, at least with regards to stages 1-3, consistent with Aristotle's theory of deliberation, though Aristotle would not suggest that the end is autonomy. And, indeed, Kazcynski's theory of autonomy is deeply rooted in his views on what is possible from pre-industrial social units. If human beings do not meet stages 1-3 on a regular basis in their working world, they become demoralized and cynical. If stages 1-3 do not end in autonomy then the action's final purpose has been robbed. In Marxian vernacular, they are alienated. The interest in pre-industrial society consists in its promise of a more fluid connection to real autonomy through action. And Kazcynski is probably right about this in many, many ways.

But let us say, for argument's sake, that not all people feel that they are autonomous in a life of chopping wood and hewing water. Let's say, for sake of argument, that some people feel that they are made into natural slaves by such inconvenience. For them, actions that aim at increasing the cultural understanding and service to others (for example), are those actions which greatly fulfill their conception of autonomy or the good life or whatever. Well, Kazcinski's action theory or theory of rational choice could model the stages of their action, but his prescriptions for the kind of action that produces 'real autonomy' would be falsified. But, again, he could reply with the false consciousness objection mentioned above.

Thus, K's theory of action is sound, though his theory of value is perhaps relevant only to limited contexts. Verdict: good model of action, but a limited appreciation of the social context of value.